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doi:10.1016/j.ejvs.2008.05.006Abstract Demand for less invasive surgical intervention has increased in recent years result-
ing in surgeons occasionally being pressurised into adopting new techniques before evidence of
safety and efficacy has been established. Unlike pharmaceutical research, most innovative sur-
gical procedures enter surgical practice without regulatory oversight. This anomaly was re-
cently highlighted in the ‘Bristol Report’ resulting in a recommendation that unproven
therapies or surgical techniques be subjected to ethical overview or independent oversight.
When a novel technique is introduced, the surgeon will find himself/herself gaining profi-
ciency and experience on suitable patients. Hence the surgeon embarks on a ‘learning curve’.
A learning curve can be defined as a graphic representation showing the relationship between
experience with a procedure and outcome. Studies demonstrate that learning curves generally
‘flatten out’ as experience increases, resulting in fewer complications and less of a need to
convert to the standard procedure.
In addition to lack of regulatory oversight, it is this learning curve that gives rise to many
ethical and legal dilemmas. This paper considers the ethical issues relating to a surgeon’s can-
dour and clinical equipoise, the legal standard of care in a negligence action and the ethical
and legal implications regarding risk disclosure during informed consent. The paper concludes
by considering a more patient centred approach where new and innovative therapies are being
considered in order to ensure good medical practice and avoid litigation for allegations of neg-
ligence or breach of human rights.
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The learning curve where beginners hone their skills prior to
passing on the benefit to others is a necessary and, to a large
extent, unavoidable aspect of becoming a competent and
skilled practitioner. Advancements such as computerd by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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‘Second Life’ might be usefully employed to help clinicians
gain proficiency in skills. For surgeons, workshops (often
funded by industry) are established in order to train and
develop skills in using innovative surgical devices/tech-
niques. Operating on cadavers and animals may also offer
useful opportunities to practice surgical technique. The final
test, however, is to intervene upon a patient. This is
a situation where there is no entirely satisfactory alterna-
tive, particularly where new and innovative surgical/inter-
ventional techniques are being considered.
This paper considers the ethical and legal dilemmas that
lie at the heart of the learning curve associated with
innovative surgery, particularly for otherwise experienced
clinicians. Candour, effective communication and informed
consent are central to this discussion, and are of increasing
importance as well as relevance for surgeons. Entry into
clinical research studies requires a centre to qualify as one
of excellence prior to participation: a situation usually
proved by the successful completion of a qualifying number
of procedures. We will confine ourselves to consideration of
competent adults and propose a more patient-centred
approach to consent as well as rapid dissemination of early
findings in an endeavour to maximise benefits and reduce
potential harm to patients. The law stated is as applied in
England and Wales.Innovation in Surgical Practice
Innovation and creativity has preceded most major ad-
vancements in surgery and, without doubt, retains a funda-
mental role in the continual and sustained development of
clinical practice. Major surgical (interventional) advance-
ments have in the main been acquired by incremental and
sustained modification of treatment. The drive to contin-
ually improve and enhance quality outcomes places surgical
innovation as pivotal to clinical progress, a position which
might potentially present risks to patients and professional
reputations alike.
In certain circumstances, evidence may suggest that the
use of a novel technique is reasonably safe, provided safety
and durability markers following ‘bench testing’ animal
data are available. There may even be some evidence from
research on humans that has emanated from countries
where ethical and legal restraints are possibly less strin-
gent. However, surgeons can also adopt new technologies
into their practice, even when there is little in the way of
evidence to support the efficacy of such innovation.
The rate of advancement in surgical practice together
with rapid dissemination by internet and the media has
meant that surgeons are very soon aware of the latest
innovations. This may encourage surgeons (sometimes at
the behest of patients) to demand access to innovative
procedures before they have been validated. In the United
States the American College of Surgeons has stated that it is
‘‘essential that the value and safety of a new procedure is
established before it is widely used on patients.’’1 The
learning curve of innovative practice creates ethical and
legal tensions. Clinicians have a professional obligation to
continually develop and improve their expertise, which to
some degree can be met by the discretion to innovate.A system that over regulates could stifle surgical advance-
ment and fetter creativity aimed at improving patient care.Innovative Intervention or Research?
Clinical interventions have traditionally been classified as:
established treatment; innovative therapy, or research
procedures.2 The aim of medical treatment is to care for
each patient in his/her own best interests, whereas medi-
cal research is undertaken in order to produce new infor-
mation and knowledge for the collective benefit of future
recipients of care. The aim of research is not primarily
for the benefit of an individual patient, although incidental
benefits may, of course, be acquired. Research has there-
fore been distinguished from conventional therapy on the
grounds of the clinician’s intent.3
To some extent, advances in surgical therapy represent
a form of research, in that the outcome (which might be of
therapeutic benefit to the individual patient) could argu-
ably be of value to future patients as well as of educational
benefit to the doctor concerned. The accurate conceptu-
alisation of innovative therapy is, therefore, an essential
precursor to its further analysis. In the UK, there is much
greater regulation and oversight in animal experimentation
than there is for evaluating innovative techniques in
surgery. It would, therefore, seem unquestionable that
therapeutic innovation ought to be subject to similar
regulatory oversight as any other clinical research regime.
The lack of a clear distinction between research and
innovation has (to some extent) constrained the ability of
independent evaluation, regulation and continual moni-
toring.4 As a result, certain procedures have entered main-
stream practice without prior validation and regulatory
oversight. Innovative therapy encompasses a wider range
of activity than formal research activities. In the context
of surgical practice minor modifications of procedure in
circumstances where increased risk to patients is not ex-
pected will fall within the category of standard medical
care, since by its nature clinical care must be adapted to
suit individual patient need. In these circumstances the
necessary modifications to care will be implied and incorpo-
rated under the umbrella of consent for the original
procedure.
This situation is, however, fundamentally at variance
from a planned surgical intervention where a new procedure
that differs from an established one is to be undertaken.
Whether such a practicemight pose a greater risk to patients
will, at this stage, be unclear. An innovation that is pre-
cipitated by a bespoke clinical need will be ethically
justified and the consent process should ideally include
specific reference to the experimental and possibly unique
dimension of the procedure. Omission of this detail would
undoubtedly violate a patient’s right to self-determination
and could be the catalyst for a subsequent legal or
regulatory action.
The categorisation of therapeutic care, innovation and
research is convenient and intellectually attractive. How-
ever, it obscures the reality that in some situations no clear
line of demarcation exists between innovation and re-
search. This distinction is critical. Whilst therapeutic care
and ‘‘tinkering at the edges’’ is subject to professional
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The point at which research ethical committee oversight is
required remains nebulous.Innovation as a Sentinel Standard of Care
Clinicians tend to introduce incremental modifications in
light of experience and patient-centred care. The Bristol
Report stated that it would be unacceptable for unproven
therapies or surgical techniques to be undertaken without
formal ethical overview or independent oversight. The
Report states that patients have a right to be told, as
part of the consent process, of the experience that the doc-
tor has had in that particular procedure. This position is in
congruence with common law. Since 1998, the remit of the
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence in-
cludes the assessment and efficacy of innovative therapies.
New pharmaceutical products are subject to research
ethical committee approval, whereas equivalent ethical
oversight of surgical innovation is not always the norm.
New surgical techniques have traditionally been introduced
into clinical care in an unregulated fashion, largely at the
discretion of the surgeon concerned.5 Indeed this is amply
illustrated in the advancement of the ‘laparoscopic revolu-
tion’ which was introduced without any formal regulation
or control.6 Similarly, with Endovascular Aneurysm Repair
(EVAR), the risk, cost and outcomes of this novel procedure
were uncertain at the time of introduction and were
quickly adopted, despite a lack of evidence regarding its
safety and efficacy. Nowadays much of contemporary
surgical advancement is driven by commercial enterprise,
especially with regard to the introduction and development
of new surgical devices. The importance of independent re-
view, as recommended by the Bristol Inquiry is therefore
heightened.7
Traditionally, clinical discretion has had wide latitude in
the context of pioneering therapy.8 Without doubt, how-
ever, innovatory enterprise must be subject to principled
independent scrutiny. Ethical acceptability mandates that
the potential benefits of an intervention outweigh any
inherent risks of harm.9 Harm in this context ought to be in-
terpreted wider than physical harm and should encompass
loss of trust or damage to the reputation of the medical
profession.10 Patients who agree to participate in research
or innovative practice must always be treated in their best
interests, and never as a means to an end. The principle of
protecting human subjects must supersede the anticipated
‘greater good’ of clinical research.11
When new technology is introduced, a surgeon has to
gain experience in using the technique. Often, the surgeon
attends weekend workshops or enrols on short courses in an
attempt to acquire the skills inherent in that procedure. It
is arguable whether training such as this is sufficient. It has
been argued that ‘‘the presumption that new and techni-
cally demanding surgical skills can be learned in a weekend
course makes us vulnerable to the questioning of our
profession and of our skills as surgeons.’’12 This raises the
issue of whether the surgeon should critically reflect on
his/her own competence to perform a technique following
such a short introduction, prior to using the technique on
the first ‘suitable’ patient. The ethical boundaries of usingpatients as ‘guinea pigs’ in order to refine innovative surgi-
cal skills are indistinct and, in practice, remain largely
a matter of personal professional conscience. In a prospec-
tive analysis of 1518 laparoscopic cholecystectomies, one
US centre showed that the incidence of bile duct injury in
the first 13 patients was 2.2% compared with 0.1% in subse-
quent patients indicating a higher morbidity at the steep
end of the learning curve.13 In the pioneering days of
laparoscopic cholecystectomy, it was asserted that severe
injury and even death were relatively common,14 demon-
strating the potentially detrimental impact upon patients
when a new surgical procedure is introduced. A similar phe-
nomenon was also observed in patients undergoing carotid
angioplasty. The earliest group of patients in Lin’s series in-
curred an 8% death/stroke rate which had declined to 0%
over a 40 month period.15 Notwithstanding the good inten-
tions of anyone wishing to introduce a new intervention,
purely from an ethical perspective, harm suffered by a pa-
tient at this early ‘learning curve’ stage cannot be in his/
her best interest, despite the contention that the proce-
dure is therapeutic. Such practices may compromise the
patient’s trust in the surgeon.16Legal and Ethical Considerations
In the UK, the legal test for the required standard of care is
based on the ‘Bolam’ principle. This represents the
standard of care that is endorsed by a responsible body of
professional opinion. Any clinical care that falls below
this standard could form the basis of a civil (or in extreme
cases criminal) action. The Bolam principle is applied in
circumstances where an action is brought in negligence.
In the context of novel treatments, difficulties may arise
with ascertaining a ‘responsible body of professional
opinion’. By its very nature, a surgeon performing an
innovative procedure may be at the frontier of medical
science so that no other experts may be found to constitute
a ‘‘responsible body’’ who are then able to assert an
authoritative opinion. It is settled law that deviation from
approved practice does not necessarily amount to negli-
gence, and in Simms17 it was recognised that it would be
against the public interest to impede medical progress
just because of the absence of a Bolam endorsement. It
remains to be tested as to how the courts would assess
the legal standard in a case of alleged negligence involving
the use of an innovative surgical or interventional tech-
nique. Some factors that might be considered would be
the extent to which its use was justified in the circum-
stances, whether there was evidence of previous trials of
the treatment, the seriousness of the patient’s condition
and the extent of the foreseeable risk in the procedure.18
A concept traditionally used by medical researchers as
a cognitive justification for entering patients into research
trials is that of ‘equipoise’, a situation described as
a clinician’s ‘honest doubt as to which of two clinical
interventions is more beneficial for the patient’.19 At the
bedside, this mandates that a patient should not be ran-
domly assigned to one of two or more different treatment
options unless there is a state of honest, collective profes-
sional uncertainty as to which treatment is superior. In prac-
tice, the state of equipoise is there to show that random
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therapeutically reasonable, and under these circumstances,
it would not be unethical for a doctor to administer the new
treatment.
At the commencement of a new treatment modality it is
not possible for anyone, including the clinician, to know
with certainty whether the anticipated benefits of the new
technique will be superior to those currently available. At
this stage true equipoise will exist. As experience is gained,
however, this position is likely to change. Since it is
apparent that the dividing line between innovation and
research is finely balanced, the concept of equipoise can be
extrapolated to the learning curve. This serves to add
a further dimension of complexity to the ethical equation.
As was identified in Bristol,7 the expertise of each individ-
ual surgeon has a unique and measurable impact upon the
likely success of an intervention. Accordingly, any surgeon
on a learning curve (despite his pre-existing unquestionable
expertise and experience) is likely to have a lower success
rate at the start of a novel technique.
To what extent can it be ethically justifiable for an
experienced surgeon, already highly proficient in a proce-
dure, to embark upon a learning curve for an innovation, the
benefits of which are still speculative, and in the knowledge
that experience might be gained at the possible cost to early
recipients of care? Early problems with any new technique
may skew results and could have a higher morbidity and
mortality, or expose the patient to more adverse events that
conventional treatment. In the more traditional research
setting when adverse events become apparent, the research
is stopped. However, with innovative therapy there is no
such constraint as this type of information is regarded as an
essential precursor towards developing formal paradigms
(such as randomised controlled trials) that are then used to
build an evidence base.
Consider a situation where the use of an innovative
procedure on twelve patients is a mandatory requirement
before participation in a formal trial can take place. It is
a moot point whether the procedure has to be undertaken
in all of the twelve patients, or whether it should be pre-
emptively terminated if the emergent distortion in the
learning curve is indicative of recurring adverse events to
participants. Whilst it is accepted that the shape of the
learning curve will vary among individual surgeons and the
specific task in hand,20 nonetheless we propose that it
should be an indicator of the proficiency and safety of an
innovative technique. We do not support the claim that
with any new surgical procedure a randomised trial should
begin with the first patient,21 as this could potentially stifle
advancement in surgical technique. However, we do hold
the firm conviction that the learning curve needs careful
monitoring to ensure safety and efficacy.
The occurrence of harm to a patient on the learning
curve of an innovative surgical technique might be a reason
to stop the technique. However, the occurrence of harm in
itself should not necessarily discourage the technique as this
may be due to an array of confounding variables including
the intrinsic abilities of the operator. Key factors to consider
would be the seriousness of the harm and its frequency. A
balance needs to be struck between compounding a problem
of injury to patients and the somewhat tenuous utilitarian
argument that individual morbidity is justified on thegrounds of possible long-term wider good for future re-
cipients of such interventions. The moral conscience of the
individual surgeon engages forcefully at this critical junc-
ture, especially as the surgeon is usually an experienced
practitioner who is able to offer an alternative traditional
technique with which he is familiar. In the absence of the
belief that equipoise exists at this stage, the notion that the
clinician should continue with the technique is repellent and
would fly in the face of professionalism.A Patient-Centred Focus for Innovative
Intervention
The law has long since recognised the role of novel
procedures in the development of medical science. In
Corbett,22 it was observed that an innovative procedure un-
dertaken for genuine therapeutic reasons was a decision for
the patient and doctor concerned in the case. This implies
that the law should be kept out of decision-making. How-
ever, in recent years there has been a decline in profes-
sional autonomy, partly due to an increased regard for
a patient’s right to self-determination. This trend is re-
flected in the rise in litigation where insufficient informa-
tion disclosure is alleged.23
Although consent is a legal defence in medical negligence
claims, it is not conclusive. There is legal authority which
holds that a patient cannot consent to negligent treatment.
A medical practitioner can be liable for negligence based on
inadequate information being given to the patient, as
opposed to being negligent in the actual performance of
the procedure.24 Any defence for non-disclosure on the
basis of therapeutic privilege would probably have little
chance of success in the English courts. It is essential there-
fore that the patient is informed of any uncertainty regard-
ing the risks, all reasonably foreseeable risks and an open
discussion should be entered into regarding alternative
established surgical procedures. Thus, the need for patient
consent raises particular and unique complexities in the
context of therapeutic innovation.
The Declaration of Helsinki requires that a patient is
informed of all the risks and benefits inherent in an in-
novative procedure.25 Case law mandates that the level of
information disclosed regarding risk given to a patient during
the consent process largely depends upon what is a material
risk to that particular patient.26 The relative inexperience of
a surgeon embarking on a learning curve might seriously
adversely impact upon the outcome. Arguably, this risk is
material and therefore subject to disclosure in law. There
may be an additional legal onus on the clinician to ensure
that the patient understands all aspects of the procedure be-
fore it is attempted. However, the extent to which this is
feasible in practice is dubious. The fact that the procedure
has had limited application precludes the provision of critical
information that a patient may expect including an individ-
ual surgeon’s success rates. Performance data of a surgeon
may be amaterial factor for a patient in the consent process.
An honest portrayal of the lack of available informationmust
be made clear.
In order to legitimise innovative care, consent based
upon adequate information is mandatory. In a recent study
of surgeons involved in new procedures, only one third
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ipated operation during the consent process.27 In the United
States, much of the litigation involving novel surgical tech-
niques have revolved around lack of adequate consent and
not being informed that the technique was experimental in
nature.28 In Europe such practice could form the basis of
a legal challenge founded on the violation of Human Rights.
Lack of informed consent prior to innovative treatment
could breach articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention
on Human Rights. Autonomy, as protected by Article 8,
could be violated through compromising self-determination
as a result of inadequate information being provided.
Furthermore, a recipient of novel treatment might allege
a violation of article 3, which prohibits inhumane and de-
grading treatment, in the absence of full information disclo-
sure. Surgeons should, therefore, be diligent in ensuring
that patients are fully aware that the proposed procedure
is innovative in nature, and that they understand that the
clinician may be uncertain of outcome as well as being
‘on a learning curve’. Failure to do so would be contrary
to good medical practice and could lead to litigation.Conclusion
History has shown that advancements in clinical care are an
essential aspect of a modern health service and, as such,
should be encouraged and facilitated. Surgical practice is
a well regulated speciality, a position shared by clinical
research. Innovation, however, sits in a perceptible lacuna,
in that regulation exists largely at a personal, professional
level. Whilst it is clear that regulation and control is
necessary in order to prevent risk to patients, control
cannot be imposed to such a degree that innovation is
stultified and progress stopped. However, in the absence of
a regulatory framework, there is a real danger that patients
might be inadvertently harmed.
We would therefore propose that where the surgeon
embarks on any learning curve, it is imperative that risks
and outcomes in the procedure should be subjected to early
dissemination in order to facilitate learning and the
avoidance of recognised harm. Good medical practice
requires the surgeon to inform the patient of any un-
certainty regarding risks associated with the procedure,
ensure that the patient fully understands that the pro-
cedure is new and that they have used the technique on
few, if any, patients before. It is essential that the surgeon
should never forget that they should be acting in their
patients best interest at all times. It is therefore recom-
mended that surgeons should always reflect on their own
competence to perform any novel techniques in order to
avoid unnecessary harm to patients Not to do so may be
deemed as negligent practice in light of the criticism arising
from the Bristol Report and the fact that autonomy and self
determination is vehemently protected under domestic and
European law.References
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